(Adnkronos) – After the coordinated offensive by jihadist and separatist groups that hit Mali, reaching the capital Bamako, the country faces a phase of great uncertainty. The killing of the Defense Minister and the loss of strategic areas in the north have put pressure on the military junta led by General Assimi Goita. According to a BBC analysis, three possible scenarios are emerging.
The first is that of the junta’s stability, at least in the short term, with the launch of a counter-offensive against the alliance between the Azawad Liberation Front (Fla – Tuareg separatists) and the jihadist group Jnim, linked to al-Qaeda. But the outcome of the operations will be decisive: success or failure “will determine the longevity of the junta,” explained Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst at the consulting firm Control Risks.
Also weighing heavily is the death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara, a central figure in the balance of power and relations with Moscow. According to Ulf Laessing of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, his disappearance could jeopardize ties with Russia: Camara was in fact “Moscow’s main interlocutor and the mastermind behind the deployment of Russian mercenaries in the Sahel.”
On the ground, while Malian forces try to secure key areas, pressure remains high. The Fla has already indicated its intention to advance south from Kidal. “We want to take control of the city of Gao,” said spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, adding that Timbuktu is also in their sights: “It will be easy to conquer once we control Gao and Kidal.”
In recent months, moreover, the junta had already been put in difficulty by the fuel blockade imposed by Jnim on the capital. If the armed groups manage to maintain their advance, Mali could slide into a prolonged conflict, with direct consequences on the stability of military power.
The second scenario foresees a junta still in power but forced to diversify its alliances. The offensive has in fact weakened Russia’s image as a reliable partner. While not breaking with Moscow, Bamako could strengthen relations with other actors, such as Turkey – according to Ochieng already engaged with personnel tasked with “training the presidential guard” – and reopen dialogue with the United States. The possible role of the Alliance of Sahel States also remains in the background.
The third scenario is that of a weakening or even a fall of the junta under military and internal pressure. In this case, power could pass to new actors, but with strong uncertainties. The alliance between Fla and Jnim remains fragile: the two groups have had a fluctuating relationship since 2012, when the Tuareg separatist revolt was partly absorbed by the jihadists.
A Fla spokesman called Jnim fighters “cousins,” emphasizing that “we have the same enemy, so we must be under the same umbrella.” But Fla leader Sayed Bin Bella ruled out a merger: “All the flags we have raised are ours, not al-Qaeda’s. If they want to join us, they must leave the global organization.”
According to analysts, these ideological differences could complicate any power sharing. In recent years, Jnim has toned down the global jihadist rhetoric typical of al-Qaeda, and according to Ochieng, one possible outcome could be a scenario similar to that in Syria, with a group once affiliated with the jihadist network capable of taking control of the country.
